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T. FAGAN, JR.

long been recognized that the "fair haired favorites"
of Anglo-American law are the holder in due course and
the entity represented by the fiduciary. Indeed, when these
two are opposing parties to a controversy involving a negotiable instrument, the apparent clash of notice standards
which exist for their protection has led many to the belief
that the solution lies only in corrective legislation.1
The drastic remedy of legislative change is not necessary
however to resolve this problem. Originally the two bodies
of law incorporating these standards were superimposed because activity governed by one was performed in a field governed by the other. Unfortunately the attempted merger
resulted in discord due in part to improper legal analysis and
case evaluation. In the opinion of the writer, a proper reconciliation of the apparently conflicting notice standards of the
N.I.L. and fiduciary law will demonstrate that there is no
justifiable reason for them to be at variance when circumstances dictate their joint application.
T HAS

THE FIDUCIARY POWER CONCEPT

Such a reconciliation is best begun by establishing the
concept of fiduciary power. Fiduciaries are representatives
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
'The HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS for 1921 shows that banking interests urged the preparation of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act to straighten out the uncertainty in the
law regarding the transfer of fiduciaries' and agents' commercial paper.
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and as such the act of a fiduciary is a representative act.2
When activity is offered as representative activity it is obvious that it will not bind the entity so represented unless
power exists in the actor to achieve such effect. This power
to perform representative activity does not exist because of
the fiduciary relation, on the contrary, the fiduciary relation
exists because of the acceptance of such power by the named
fiduciary.
The power to perform representative activity is therefore the subject of grant. It may come through law by the
appointment of an administrator, receiver or guardian, etc.;
or it may come from the direct grant of an individual, such
as through a power of attorney, a trust instrument or 'a will.
Since the grant establishes the power, the scope of the power
is defined by the grant. Unless the power to perform the
specific representative act is expressly conferred by law or
by grant of an individual, or unless it arises by necessary implication from a grant, the power is nonexistent and any attempted representation without power will not bind the entity
unless estoppel can be invoked against it. This power concept of fiduciary law is completely consistent with negotiable
instruments law and should not be confused with "abuse of
power," which presumes the existence of power. Forgery or
unauthorized signature is a real defense under the N.I.L.,
based on lack of power, and is available against even the
holder in due course.3 Diversion, on the other hand, is a
personal defense that recognizes existing power but is based
on its improper exercise.
AGENCY AUTHORITY

No treatment of the fiduciary power concept is complete
unless it takes cognizance of the confusion which has long
existed in fiduciary law concerning the power of agents to
bind principals in dealings with third parties. The problem,
2 Comment a in Section 13 of the Restatement of Agency defines fiduciary
as "a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for
the benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking."
See also

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

§ 2, comment b (1935).
§ 23.

3 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
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which is as real today as it was in the past, concerns the
4
definition and application of agency authority.
It is not the primary purpose nor aim of this paper to
resolve and clarify such confusion, but since it exists, an
attempt will be made to redefine authority in order to clearly
establish the notice concepts which it embodies, and also to
aid in determining the proper application of the fiduciary
power concept in situations
involving agents signing nego5
tiable instruments.
Present Definition
Professor Arthur Linton Corbin, in a comment regarded
by some as a "classic on the 'authority' of an agent," I states
the currently accepted definition of authority as "an oral
or written communication from the principal to the agent,
expressing an actual intention that the agent shall act on the
principal's behalf in one or more transactions with third
persons, or causing the agent reasonably to believe that such
was the principal's intention." 7 Under this definition, the
distinction between authority and apparent authority lies in
the type of the communication. If communicated to the
agent, it is authority-if communicated to the third party, it
is apparent authority. Apparent authority may therefore
coincide with or contradict authority.
Proposed Definition
The following definitions are submitted in opposition to
the definition of authority as stated above. An agency power,
4

See Conard, What's Wrong With Agency?, 1 J.

LEGAL

ED. 540, 555

(1949); Note, Analysis Of "Apparent Authority" In Principal And Agent,
1 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1933).
5 That confusion presently exists concerning its definition and application

to negotiable instruments is illustrated by the conflicting views found in the
majority and dissenting opinions in the New York Court of Appeals case of

Wen Kroy Realty Co. v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 260 N.Y. 84,
183 N.E. 73 (1932). See Dispatch Printing Co. v. National Bank Of Commerce,
109 Minn. 440, 124 N.W. 236 (1910).
6 "Corbin's Classic on the 'authority' of an agent offers a vastly more
meaningful way of thinking about the actual and apparent authority cases."
Conard, supra note 4, at 562.

7 Comment, The "Authority" Of An Agent-Definition, 34 YALE L.J. 788,
793 (1925).
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as distinguished from other types of fiduciary power, is the
ability which exists in the grantee of the power to produce a
change in a given legal relation involving the grantor of the
power, through representative juristic activity performed
within a defined area.8 Consent of the grantor that the
agency power exist is a prerequisite for its existence because
agency is a voluntary relationship. 9 This consent may only
be legally established by an overt manifestation of the grantor
since the law is not concerned with "unevinced mental determination." 10 This manifestation of consent is called authority. Authority, properly defined, is the process whereby
real agency power is granted through the manifestation by
the grantor of his consent that such power exist, whether the
manifestation be made solely to the grantee, solely to a third
party, or to the grantee and third party jointly. 1 This manifestation can take the form of words, acts or circumstances
s Strangely enough, no attempt has ever been made prior to this to define
"agency power." Writers have uniformly confined their expression to the
definition of power without attempting further classification. Section 6 of the
Restatement of Agency defines power as "an ability on the part of a person to
produce a change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given act."
The employment of the term "representative juristic activity" in the definition is in recognition of the distinction made between juristic and nonjuristic
acts. FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY 23 (1954) ; HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 117
(12th ed. 1917); MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 124 (5th ed. 1896). Agency
power is thereby confined to the ability to transfer to third parties the principal's
consent to be bound in legal transactions. Power which the agent has to bind
his principal for tortious activity is not agency power but power which comes
from either law or from an employment relation.
9 Since agency power, by definition, has been restricted to "representative
juristic activity," such ability is the essence of agency itself which cannot exist
except at the will and by the voluntary act of the principal. McGoldrick v.
Willits, 52 N.Y. 612 (1873); Stringham v. St. Nicholas Ins. Co., 4 Abb. App.
Dec. 315 (N.Y. 1867); Roberge v. Monheimer, 21 Misc. 491, 47 N.Y. Supp.
655 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1897); Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66, 35 N.W. 568
(1887); Pole v. Leask, 28 Beav. 562, 54 Eng. Rep. 481 (Rolls 1860), aff'd,
33 L.J. Ch. 155, 8 L.T. 645 (H.L. 1863). See also 1 MECHEM, AGENCY § 211

(2d ed. 1914).

10 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 26 and comments (1933).
11 By defining authority as an operative fact rather than as a legal relation,

the writer is in accord with Professor Hohfeld who suggests that ambiguity
arises in the use of the term when it is defined as a legal relation because of
the tendency to blend operative facts with the powers thereby created.

Hohfeld,

Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied 1n Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 44 (1913).
Section 7 of the Restatement of Agency adopts the legal relation concept
and defines authority as "the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of
the principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of
consent to him."
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as long as they are attributable to the grantor.1 2 The limit
of power established by one manifestation may be extended
by another manifestation. In such case, authority increases
real power. 1 3 Once the real power exists, third parties who
deal with an agent exercising such power need not establish
a reliance upon the manifestation which created the power
in order to bind the principal.:4
§§

12 RESTATEmENT, AGENCY
26,
23 In the recent English case of

27 (1933).

Reckitt v. Barnett, Pembroke And Slater,
Ltd., [1929] A.C. 176 (1928), the principal gave a formal power of attorney
under seal to the agent. The agent filed a copy of the power with the principal's bank claiming that the power authorized him to draw checks on the
principal's account. Since the power did not, in terms, authorize the drawing
of checks, the bank justifiably refused to permit the agent to draw on the
account. Rather than draw up a new power to include such acts, the principal
sent the following letter to the bank:
"Dear Sirs,
Referring to the power of attorney which I have given in favour of
Mr. H. James Selborne Woodhouse and which you have inspected, please
note that I wish the power to cover the drawing of cheques upon you by
Mr. Woodhouse without restriction." Id. at 180.
The original of the letter was filed at the bank and the agent was then
permitted to draw checks on the account. Thereafter, the agent purchased a
car for himself and gave a check drawn on the principal's account in payment.
In an action brought by the principal against the payee, the actual authority was
construed by the court to include the drawing of checks on the principal's
account. The court construed the formal power and the letter to the bank
together to determine the actual power. The third party had not relied on
either, which ruled out apparent authority. The original grant was thereby increased by a later manifestation made directly to a third party and the result
was an increase in real agency power. Recovery was allowed the principal,
however, since the court construed "without restriction" in the letter to the bank
as not to include issuing checks on the principal's account to pay the agent's
private debts. The real power to issue checks did not include the power to
issue for other than the benefit of the principal
14 a) A authorized B to buy a horse. A later told C that B had agency
power to buy several horses for A. B, learning of the statement A made to C,
purchased several horses from D for A. Although D had no knowledge of the
manifestations made by A to C, he may hold A to the sale since B was actually
authorized to make such purchase. A's subsequent manifestation to C extended
A's original grant of agency power to B. See Reckitt v. Barnett, Pembroke
And Slater, Ltd., supra note 13.
b) Suppose A said to C, "B is my agent for the purchase of a horse." If
A has not as yet spoken to B, then the most that exists between A and B is an
ostensible but not a real agency. However, a real agency power exists in B to
purchase a horse for A by virtue of the grant of power originating from the
manifestation of A to C. When B learns of the statement to C, he may purchase a horse for A from any third party, and as such, acts as A's real agent,
not merely an ostensible agent, since his exercise of the real power creates a
real agency.
Professor Seavey admits that in the above hypothetical case. a real power
exists, but he limits it to dealings with the particular person or class of persons

158

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 30

Apparent authority is not authority. Apparent authority, properly defined, is the process whereby an apparent, but
not a real, agency power is established through the manifestation by the principal to a third party of consent to the
existence of such power, which manifestation contradicts a
manifestation of consent to agency power already made by
the principal to the agent. 5
Explanation of Present Definition
The proponents of an approach which restricts authority

to consent communicated to the agent give several explanations for such restriction. Professor Corbin, a spokesman for

the present view, admits that it is quite possible to define
authority so as to include manifestations of consent made to
third parties but not communicated to the agent. "This
would unnecessarily complicate the definition, however. The

case would seldom happen and there is no presently established usage including such a case." 16

It is submitted that

this rather arbitrary rejection results in an oversimplification of the definition ol' authority which in turn is one of the
prime causes of the present unnecessary complexity in the

law involving apparent authority.
It has been stated that agency power will not exist without the manifested consent of the principal. 1 7 Professor
to whom the authority is apparent. Seavey, The Rationale Of Agency, 29 YALE
L.J. 859 (1920). Once the real power is admitted, it is arbitrary to limit its

use only to those who are aware of its existence.
Is In example a, supra note 14, if A in his original grant of power to B had
expressly denied further power to B by stating, "you are authorized to buy only
one horse for me and no more," then the subsequent manifestation to C would
contradict the power already in existence rather than add to it. B would have
no right to rely on such manifestation in face of the express denial made to
him by A, until he checked with A to determine if A intended thereby to revoke
such denial.
In example b, supra note 14, if A had expressly told B, "I do not wish that
you act as my agent," then the subsequent manifestation to C would have contradicted the express denial of intention that such power exist. B would have
no right to rely on such manifestation until he checked with A to determine A's
real intent. If B acted without checking, his activity would be that of an ostensible agent, not a real agent, and A would be bound only if B dealt with C,
or with other third parties who had relied on A's statement.
16 Comment, The "Authority" Of An Agent-Definition, 34 YALE LJ. 788,
793 (1925).
17 See note 9 supra.
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Corbin, in support of his definition of authority, contradicts
this statement and argues that a real agency power can be
established without authority, either real or apparent. Accordingly, its rightful exercise can only be determined by
expressions from the principal to the agent. 8 However, the
power existing in the cases he uses for illustration is not an
agency power, but one created by law. 1 He contends further
that a real agency power will exist although based only on
apparent authority which conflicts with actual authority.
However, when manifestations of consent are contradictory,
the latest manifestation to the agent should determine the
existence and extent of the real power. The agent being the
recipient of the grant, any manifestation to third parties
which contradicts, rather than coincides with or extends, the
one made to the agent, of necessity is false. No real power
should exist in the area of contradiction established by this
false manifestation, but the principal should be estopped from
denying that an apparent power exists as against those who
have relied upon the false manifestation in ignorance of the
true manifestation.

20

The Restatement of Agency, which also predicates authority upon consent communicated to the agent, 2' argues
that since agency is a voluntary relationship it is established,
as is any other consensual arrangement, by offer and acceptance. 22 Before agency can exist, an offer emanating from
the proposed principal must be communicated to the intended
agent. Acceptance is of course required but, as in the case
Is See Comment, supra note 16.
19 The illustrations chosen are cases involving so-called "agency by necessity"
wherein the law binds the husband for supplies contracted for by the wife.
Actually this may be explained without the aid of agency in that the purchase
creates a quasi-contractual obligation against the husband.
20 A controversy has waged through the years as to whether estoppel or
the objective theory of contracts should be the controlling feature of apparent
authority. See Cook, "Agency By Estoppel," 5 CoLum. L. REv. 36 (1905), and
"Agency By Estoppel: A Reply," 6 CoLoum. L. REv. 34 (1906) ; Ewart, Estoppel
-Principal And Agent, 16 HARV. L. REv. 186 (1903), and "Agency By
Estoppel" 5 CoLrua. L. REv. 354 (1905). See also MEcHEm, AGENCY §§ 85, 89
(4th ed. 1952). The controversy has overlooked the fact that the grant of
agency power is separate from the offer made by the agent to the third party.
Once the real power is established, no reliance or estoppel should be necessary
to bind the principal. If no real power exists, estoppel is the only solution.
21 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 7 (1933).
22 Id. § 15 and comments.
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of contractual relations, the manifestation of the principal
may be such that it is not necessary for the acceptance to be
communicated to him. 23

Once the necessity of an offer is

admitted as a condition precedent to the existence of agency,
with the further requirement of communication to the offeree
as essential to the establishment of an offer, it is readily seen
that the manifestation of consent to agency power must be
communicated by the principal to the agent. In line with
this reasoning, the Restatement of Agency defines agency as
"the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other
so to act." 24
Refutation of Present Definition
If we confine our examination of the problem to the
agency power, the error of the Restatement and Professor
Corbin becomes clear. Neither one has distinguished between
fiduciary power in general and a particular type of fiduciary
power, namely, agency power. Fiduciary power may be conferred by law or by grant, and certain powers are conferred
25 Howby law on one who has accepted an agency power.
ever, the agency relation which permits representative juristic
activity is so personal in nature that present law confines
it to voluntary grant and will not recognize its existence in
absence of the consent of both parties involved.2 6 It is obvious therefore that an agency power, as distinguished from
other types of fiduciary power, must be established by the
voluntary grant of a person.
A manifestation of willingness to make a bargain is distinguishable from the voluntary grant of a power. All that
is necessary to establish a grant of power is a clear expression
23 Ibid.
24

1d. § 1.
25 rd. § 12 and comments.
26 ".

..

[T] he duties of a fiduciary cannot be thrust upon an unwilling

person, so that the relation cannot be created, nor can it continue to exist without the consent of both parties." Seavey, The Rationale Of Agency, 29 YALE
L.J. 859, 863 (1920). It is a contradiction in terms to say that there can be

agency created by law. ". . . [A]ll cases where it is said there is agency created

by law are easily disposed of without invoking the relationship of agency." Ibid.
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of consent that the power exist.27 Powers may thus be
granted by wills and as such are treated in the same manner
as legacies. 2 8 The legacy may exist, as may the power, even
29
before the donee or grantee has knowledge of its existence.
A manifestation to a third party of a consent to the existence
of agency power, which does not contradict any manifestation already made to the agent, should establish that power
regardless of the knowledge of the intended agent, just as the
probate of a will automatically establishes a legacy in the
donee, or a power of appointment in a grantee.3 0 The
274 KNT, COMMENTARES *319.
2

8 Authorities in the field of property jealously guard the concept of power
grant, claiming that it is unique to property and as such does not extend beyond
a grant by way of deed or will with reference to real or personal property.
Professor Tiffany claimed that agency power is different from other powers in
that the effective act in the common-law powers under a will is the creation
of the power, while in agency the effective act is the execution of the power
by the agent as the act of the principal. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 273
(lst ed. 1903).
Professor Seavey has objected to this arbitrary restriction by arguing:
"The effective act in both cases is, first the grant of the power, and secondly
the execution of it. In agency the creator of the power is usually, probably
always, alive when it is executed and an agent is a fiduciary subject to control;
but this should affect neither the quality of the power nor the act of its
execution." Seavey, supra note 26, at 861 n.9.

Professor Hohfeld has stated: ".

.

. it seems clear that the power of an

agent to convey Whiteacre is not intrinsically different, so long as it endures,
from a power to convey Whiteacre in exercise of a so-called power of appointment.... In truth the creation of a power of agency does not necessarily
involve any contract rights against the principal or any one else." Hohfeld,
FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied In JudicialReasoning, 26 YArE L.J.
710, 727 (1917).
Professor Maitland argued that: "The germ of agency is hardly to be
distinguished from the germ of another institution which in our English law
has an eventful future before it, the 'use . .. !" Maitland, The Origin Of
Uses, 8 HA~v. L. Rxv. 127 (1894).
29 Attempts to make the voluntary grant of a power or a devise analogous
to an offer which must be accepted prior to existence have uniformly been
rejected. The most recent pronouncement on this point was made by the New
York Court of Appeals in Matter of Wilson, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E.2d 852
(1949). "A legatee of an unconditional legacy need never formally accept the
legacy.

If he does not wish it, he must affirmatively renounce it.. . . He

may not rid himself of his legacy except by his own affirmative act.
".... If he died it would pass to his distributees or creditors-even in
a case where he did not know of its existence." Id. at 403, 83 N.E.2d at 854.
30 Section 87 of the N.I.L., which states that if a note is made payable at a
bank, it confers authority upon the bank to pay the note out of funds of the
maker on deposit there, is a clear recognition of this fact. It is to be noted,
however, that the manifestation on the note which is conveyed to third parties
does not create an agency, but confers a real agency power. Agency does not
exist until the bank accepts by paying the note. Pease v. Warren, 29 Mich. 9
(1874).
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Restatement of Agency admits this, in effect, in its comment
concerning power. It states that a power "may exist irrespective of the consent or knowledge either of the one subject
to it or of the one holding it

....

Likewise, a person whom

another authorizes to act on his account has a power to bind
the other although he has neither legal capacity to bind himself nor the desire to act for the one who has conferred the
power upon him." 31
It is true that an offer can be made to grant a power of
agency in the event that the intended agent indicates that
he would be willing to undertake the activity. In this case
the analogy to offer and acceptance is proper and no power
exists until the offer is communicated to the intended agent
and he communicates his acceptance to the proposed principal. A grant of agency power is easily distinguishable from
an offer to make such grant.
It follows from the above reasoning that a real power of
agency can be established prior to the creation of an agency
relationship. Authority is the method whereby such power
is established. Authority is merely the manifested consent of
the grantor, the form of such manifestation being the same as
that necessary to establish any voluntary grant of power.
The intended agent must consent to the power before the
agency relationship exists. This consent is established by
either an exercise of the power or by a manifestation of consent to its existence. In line with these conclusions, agency
is properly defined as the relationship which results from the
voluntary grant of a power of representation confined to juristic activity within a defined area to be exercised subject to the
control of the grantor and consent by the grantee to the
power.
Where a limited or special agency power is granted with
a specification in such grant that no further agency power
will be permitted, any further grant intended to extend the
See also Sections 13 and 14 of the N.I.L. which state that anyone in possession of an instrument incomplete when issued is authorized to complete it in
accordance with the intent of the issuer. Knowledge that the instrument was
incomplete when issued is therefore notice of the fact that it will not bind the
issuer unless it is properly completed.
31 RESTAI"MENT,

AGENcY §6, comment b (1933).

19561

THE ENDORSING FIDUCIARY

power will be ineffective until a revocation of the express
denial of further power is communicated to the agent. In
such cases, when the further grant is attempted by a manifestation to parties other than the agent, the principal may
empower the third party or parties to communicate knowledge of the additional power to the agent. When such authorized communication is made, it is the equivalent of a
subsequent manifestation to the agent withdrawing the denial
32
of further power and establishing the additional real power.
However, the principal's mere acquiescence to the conduct of
the agent forbidden by the original grant will at most establish a ratification of activity already performed and provide
the basis of estoppel concerning future activity, for mere acquiescence, in such case, is not a manifestation of actual
power.3 3 When no denial of further power is made in the
original grant, any further grant merely adds to the original
and results in an increase of real power.
GENERAL AGENCY POWER

Authorities seem to be in general agreement concerning
the impossibility of distinguishing in the individual case between a grant of general agency power coupled with instructions relating to its use within the scope of the business, and
a grant of a limited agency power coupled with a denial of
further power. 34 It is uniformly accepted, however, that a
general agent may bind his principal by acts within the scope
of the business by virtue of apparent authority since third
parties are entitled to rely in such case on the appearance of
power stemming from the general agency. 35 Actually, a gen32 If A states to B, "You are authorized to buy only one horse for me and
no more," and subsequently tells C that B has power to buy several horses for
A and further authorizes C to communicate that fact to B, the communication
by C will be the same as if A had revoked the original denial and increased the
real33power. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 26, comment b (1933).
Kansas Educational Ass'n v. McMahan, 76 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1935);
Thurber & Co. v. Anderson, 88 Ill. 167 (1878) ; Ragatz v. Diener, 218 Iow\-a
703, 253 N.W. 824 (1934) ; Wheatley v. McRoberts, 157 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App.
1942); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 43 (1933).
34 Seavey, Agency Powers, 1 OxrA. L. REv. 3, 16 (1948) ; FERSO, PRiNCIPLES OF AGENCY § 152 (1954) ; 1 MacHE-m, AGENCY §§ 731-35 (2d ed. 1914).
35 Seavey, The Rationale Of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859 (1920) ; 1 MECHEM,
AGENCY § 739 (2d ed. 1914) ; RESTATEmENT, AGENCY §§ 161, 172, 173, 194, 195
(1933).
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eral agent does not exist unless a determination is first made
that he is empowered to act as such by the principal. Therefore, any attempt to restrict the power of a general agent by
boundaries narrower than the scope of the business should be
interpreted as an instruction concerning the use of the power
within that area. This interpretation would make estoppel
unnecessary in cases involving general agents as long as the
act is within the general scope of the business.
SPECIAL AGENCY POWER

Agents who receive a limited power in the first instance
are special agents. Apparent authority is applicable in cases
where a special agent who has been denied further powers is
presented by the principal to third parties as possessing those
powers actually denied him. Here real power does not exist
but the principal is estopped from proving this fact as against
those who rightfully relied upon his false manifestation.
It is submitted that the majority of legal scholars and
jurists have not made the proper distinction between authority and apparent authority. This has led to the erroneous
conclusion by many that apparent authority, based on reliance, is applicable only in situations involving general agents
acting within the scope of the business.38 The muddle thus
created is clarified when it is accepted that manifestation to
third parties is one method of granting real agency power and
that estoppel, based on objective notice standards, applies to
situations involving agents who have been expressly denied
further agency power by the principal, or agents who attempt
to exercise agency power beyond defined limits.

36 See the excellent collection of authorities in Note, 5 MIca. L. REv. 665
(1907).
See also TiFFANY, AGFNcY § 18 (2d ed. 1924). "They were instructed that, in cases of special agency, one who deals with the agent must
inquire into the extent of his authority, but that a principal is bound by all
that his general agent has done within the scope of the business in which he
was employed, and this, though the agent may have violated special or secret
instructions given him, but not disclosed to the party with whom the agent deals.
Surely this was correct ...
"
Butler v. Maples, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 766, 776
(1869).
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ESToPPEL BY AssISTED REPRESENTATION

One further clarification is necessary. The grant of an
agency power with instructions not to reveal the limitations
to third parties, or the grant of an agency power the limitations of which are dependent upon facts peculiarly within the
agent's knowledge, results in an actual agency power in the
agent to represent that the power limit has not been exceeded.37 This representation of power by the agent, when
false, is the equivalent of a false manifestation of consent by
the principal. Third parties in these cases may rely upon the
expressions of power made by the agent, unless notice exists
to the contrary, because he has been actually empowered to
make such expressions. A similar result is attained in instances where an individual, who by virtue of his occupation
would ordinarily possess a more general power, is employed
as a special agent and denied the power he would ordinarily
exercise. Professor Ewart refers to the above situations as
examples of "estoppel by assisted representation." 38
FIDUCIARY POWER DEFINED

It follows, upon acceptance of the foregoing clarifications, that the total concept of fiduciary power is now subject
to concise statement. Fiduciary power is the power to perform representative activity. The fiduciary must be actually
empowered to perform the specific act before the act can
bind the represented entity, unless estoppel is applicable.
Estoppel, which is based on objective notice standards, applies in situations where apparent authority exists in respect
to a special agent and in certain instances where attempts
are made to exercise fiduciary power beyond its defined limits.

37 Bank of Batavia v. New York, L.E. & V. R.R., 106 N.Y. 195, 12 N.E.
433 (1887); North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill 262 (N.Y. 1842). See also
I AECHEm, AGENCY § 759 (2d ed. 1914); REsTATEmENT, AGENCY §§ 160, 171,
172 (1933).
38 Ewart, Estoppel By Assisted Representation, 5 COLUm. L. REv. 456 (1905).
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THE FIDUCIARY MAKER OR DRAWER

Representative Contract Power
Having established the fiduciary power concept, determination will now be made of its proper application to negotiable instruments. 3 9 The negotiable instrument drawn by a
fiduciary other than an agent merits first consideration. That
instrument, when drawn and issued, is a contract. 40 Under
fiduciary law, a fiduciary other than an agent is personally
liable on the contracts which he undertakes on behalf of the
represented entity unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise. 41 If such provision is made, then his liability is
limited to the assets of the entity as long as the contract is
4 2
In the event that the
a proper and legitimate obligation.
claim is improper and the fiduciary has expressly provided
against personal liability, he may be sued for breach of implied warranty by the third party.43 Sometimes a grant of
fiduciary power will authorize the fiduciary to borrow money
for the benefit of the represented entity. If so, a negotiable
instrument issued for a fiduciary loan will also be a legitimate
44
claim against the entity.
Accordingly, before representative contract power can
exist in a fiduciary other than an agent, the proposed contract
must be proper and necessary for the entity. This does. not
depend upon the representations of the fiduciary nor on the
fact that an actual benefit may accrue to the entity through
the execution of the contract. There can never be an apparent, but not real, representative contracting power in a
fiduciary other than an agent. The actual manifestation of
such power cannot be later contradicted by false power mani"9 Cases dealing with bank liability for fiduciary deposits and collections
have been omitted in this determination. They have nothing whatever to do
with problems of notice in respect to purchase although they are sometimes
mentioned in this connection. See in general Merrill, Bankers' Liability For
Deposits Of A Fiduciary To His Personal Account, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1077
(1927).
40 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 16.
41 Taylor v. Davis' Administratrix, 110 U.S. 330 (1884).
42 Jessup v. Smith, 233 N.Y. 203, 119 N.E. 403 (1918).
43 2 ScoT, TRUSTS § 263.3 (1939).
44 Purdy v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 2 Cal. 2d 298,
40 P.2d 481 (1935).
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festations, for only in agency is the source of further fiduciary
contract Power in the represented entity itself. For this reason, the fiduciary other than agent binds only himself when
he draws a negotiable instrument, unless he is drawing it in
payment of a legitimate fiduciary expense or pursuant to an
express representative power to borrow money.
The acts of drawing and issuing an instrument for a
fiduciary loan under a power to borrow, when the fiduciary
intends to use the money obtained for his own purposes, are
not adverse acts for they result in an initial benefit to the
entity by way of receipt of funds. Subsequently the funds
are misappropriated, but this is a diversion of proceeds resulting after authorized activity.4 51 Conversely, when an agent
endorses corporate paper with an intent to use the proceeds
for his own purposes, the acts of endorsing and transferring
are adverse because they directly deprive the corporation of
assets without its consent.
Statutory Modification, of Liability
Section 20 of the N.I.L. has changed the common law
in respect to the liability of the fiduciary who draws a negotiable instrument. As long as the entity which he represents
is revealed and he indicates on the instrument that he is
signing in a representative capacity, he limits his liability to
the assets of the represented entity, provided he is empowered
to draw the instrument. On the other hand, if he is not empowered, he is individually liable on the instrument. 4
Notice Concepts
Parties who receive payment from a known fiduciary are
not thereby put on notice that he is paying from fiduciary
45 "Thus an agent may be authorized to give notes for his principal in order
to raise money to be used in the business of the latter. A third person may
inspect the power, advance the money in good faith, and the agent appropriate
it to his own use. In such a case, I should hold the principal responsible, not
because the act of the agent appeared to be within the authority, but because
the authority actually included the transaction. A power given to an agent toborrow money, upon notes or otherwise, implies that the money may be paid
to him, and so the whole transaction is strictly and literally authorized."
Mechanics Bank v. New York & N.H. K.R., 13 N.Y. 599, 634 (1856).
46 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 263.1 (1939).
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funds. However, if they have actual knowledge of the fact
that such funds are the source of payment, they are charged
further with knowledge of the law that the use of such funds
by a fiduciary is permissible only in solution of legitimate
and proper expenses necessarily incurred by the fiduciary.
If the payment does not fall within this description and the
expense is considered improper, the entity may compel the
party who received the money with such knowledge to make
restitution in full, regardless of the hardship that might exist
4
in the individual case. T
It is important to emphasize the fact that notice concepts play no part in the application of the power concept to
the negotiable instrument drawn by the fiduciary other than
an agent. Notice is only material in the recovery of fiduciary
funds used in payment of unauthorized expenses. A check,
drawn by a fiduciary who adds to his signature words indicating he signed in a representative capacity, indicates on its
face that it is drawn on fiduciary funds. All parties who take
such an instrument are placed on notice that the funds may
be recovered unless they were used for legitimate expenses.
A promissory note made by a fiduciary who indicates his representative status on the face of the note will not give such
notice, however, since payment of the note may be made from
the fiduciary's personal funds rather than from fiduciary
funds.
If the check is drawn by an agent fiduciary who is empowered to draw on his principal's funds for authorized purposes, then, although parties who take such check know from
the face of the instrument that fiduciary funds are involved,
they are entitled to rely on the representation of the agent
that his act of drawing in the specific case is authorized by
the principal. No such right of reliance exists, however, if
a reasonable man would have decided to the contrary, as in
47Squire v. 'Ordemann, 194 N.Y. 394, 87 N.E. 435 (1909); Cohnfeld v.
Tanenbaum, 176 N.Y. 126, 68 N.E. 141 (1903) ; Fellows v. Longyor, 91 N.Y.
324 (1883) ; Marshall v. De Cordova, 26 App. Div. 615, 50 N.Y. Supp. 294
(1st Dep't 1898); Matter of Amico, 175 Misc. 656, 24 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Surr.
Ct. 1941).
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the instance where the agent uses the check to pay his own

48
debt and the transferee is aware of this fact.

THE AGENT MAKER, DRAWER OR ENDORSER

The next consideration, in an ascending order of importance, is the negotiable instrument drawn or endorsed by the
agent fiduciary. Principles of liability deduced from the application of the fiduciary power concept in the preceding consideration are inapplicable here, primarily because of the
doctrine of "estoppel by assisted representation." It is the application of apparent agency signing power as distinguished
from real agency signing power that causes complications.
Analysis of case law dealing with such instruments establishes conclusively that the distortion of the doctrine of
apparent authority in this area is one of the roots of the whole
notice problem. Notice rules have been incorrectly applied
in respect to agency signing power. Furthermore, an issue
of constructive notice has arisen in the law of negotiable instruments where no such issue in fact should exist. Since
agency involving negotiable paper is ordinarily associated
with corporations in the commercial world, an analysis of
the case law of New York dealing with negotiable corporate
paper is appropriate at this point to prove the above
statements.
Again, the basic approach will be from the point of view
of fiduciary power for it is clear that an agent cannot bind
his principal by drawing or endorsing a negotiable instrument on his behalf unless he is actually or apparently empowered to so act. 49 It is also an elementary principle of
48 Lamson v. Beard, 94 Fed. 30 (7th Cir. 1899), appeal dismissed, 22 Sup.
Ct. 939 (1902); Gerard v. McCormick, 130 N.Y. 261, 29 N.E. 115 (1891);
Heig v. Caspary, 191 App. Div. 560, 181 N.Y. Supp. 633 (1st Dep't 1920),
aff'd inem., 232 N.Y. 574, 134 N.E. 577 (1922) ; State Bank v. Bache, 162 Misc.
128, 293 N.Y. Supp. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Martindale v. De Kay, 101 Misc.
728, 166 N.Y. Supp. 405 (Sup. Ct), aff'd men., 180 App. Div. 926, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 1113 (1st Dep't 1917), affd inero., 224 N.Y. 585, 120 N.E. 869 (1918).
49 "It is a mistake, to suppose that the conventional rule of commercial
negotiability has anything to do with this question, except in cases where the
paper carries no notice on its face, that it is made by somebody assuming to
be an agent. That rule stands upon an arbitrary doctrine of the law-merchant.
and not at all upon any principle of estoppel. . . . But it is a fixed requisite
of the rule, that the buyer shall be for value without notice, and, therefore,
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agency law that if this agency power to draw or endorse is not
expressly conferred, it will not be implied unless it is absolutely necessary for the exercise of the express powers
granted 0
Policy Question Re Signing Power
The strict interpretation of this particular grant of
agency power is one of the reasons why this paper has emphasized the importance of correctly defining "authority." Corporate paper makes up a large percentage of the commercial
instruments in circulation today. Since the sources of power
grants to corporate officials are the corporate charter, by-laws
and stockholder or board of director approvals, a heavy burden is placed on business by the requirement that such sources
be constantly checked to validate corporate paper. A policy
problem therefore arises concerning the power of corporate
officials to draw or endorse corporate negotiable instruments.
Specifically, the question raised is what should be the extent
of the protection afforded third parties who deal with such
paper, recognizing its great commercial volume?
New York Solution
New York uses two different approaches as a solution.
The first approach swings the protection of the law to
the third party by determining that officials of at least manufacturing corporations have implied authority to draw or endorse corporate paper on behalf of the corporation. 51 Third
nothing that gives notice on its face, is, in that particular, within the rule. So,
an instrument that shows, on its face, that it is made by one man for another,
at once, warns the taker to inquire, if the assumed agent be authorized, and that
question becomes one independent of the arbitrary rule of the law-merchant
and dependent on the doctrines that govern the law of principal and agent."
New York & N.H. R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30, 71-72 (1865). For the application of the rule to the corporate official see Jacobus v. Jamestown Mantel
Co., 211 N.Y. 154, 161, 105 N.E. 210, 212 (1914) ; Gould v. Town of Sterling,
23 N.Y. 456 (1861).
50 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Manhattan Co., 183 App. Div. 586, 170 N.Y. Supp.
81 (1st Dep't 1918); Arcade Realty Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 180 Cal. 318,
181 Pac. 66 (1919); Jackson v. National Bank, 92 Tenn. 154, 20 S.W. 802
(1893).
51 J. B. Kepner Co. v. Hutton, 226 N.Y. 674, 123 N.E. 871 (1919) (mem.
opinion); Martin v. Niagara Falls Paper Mfg. Co., 122 N.Y. 165, 25 N.E. 303
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parties may rely on such power in absence of actual knowledge to the contrary. This approach is in opposition to established law and is dangerous to employ as a general principle.
Recognizing this, the New York courts have tended to limit
its application to particular fact situations involving close
corporations where the corporate entity is more fiction than
reality and the fiduciary is actually the principal. This does
not offend fiduciary law.
The second approach is based on an estoppel argument
which had its origin in the United States Supreme Court case
of Martin v. Webb.5 2 The case held that if, over a long course
of dealing, the corporate official endorses or issues negotiable
instruments on behalf of the corporation, his signature on
such paper will bind the corporation. Since no objection is
made by the corporation, it is presumed that although the
power to do so was not originally granted, the acquiescence
of the corporation with knowledge of such activity gives rise
to an apparent signing power which it is estopped from denying. The case permitted estoppel to be invoked by "those
who are justified by the circumstances in dealing with its
officers upon the basis of that course of business." 53 The
estoppel can be justified only as to those who have been induced by knowledge of this long course of activity and have
relied upon it. If such corporate acquiescence is interpreted
as a ratification because facts show notice to it of the unauthorized acts, then the subject matter of the ratification is
the prior unauthorized acts performed in relation to the specific parties. Under the traditional doctrine of apparent authority, such ratification does not confer upon the agent real
power to act in that manner in the future as no grant of general power to endorse or issue is made directly to him by such
ratification. Future activity is governed by the apparent
power that arose from the ratification. Estoppel can be invoked only by those who rely on such apparent power. If
interpreted as an estoppel based on negligence, because the
(1890); Bressman, Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215 N.Y. Supp. 766 (Sup. Ct.
1926); Ehrlich, Inc. v. Levine, 83 Misc. 136, 144 N.Y. Supp. 818 (Sup. Ct.

1913).

52110 U.S. 7 (1884).
53Id.

at 15.
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corporation would have known of the unauthorized acts had
it used due diligence, then clearly no grant of general power
is made governing subsequent activity.
Nevertheless, the New York courts have employed this
"course of business" doctrine to protect parties who took such
originally unauthorized paper from corporate officials and
who in no way were in a position to invoke estoppel since
there was a complete lack of knowledge on their part of such
"course of business." The legal argument justifying such
protection is simple, but it conflicts with the traditional apparent authority doctrine. The case of Hanover Nat'l Bank
v. American Dock and Trust Co." concerned an officer of a
defendant warehouse company who had issued negotiable
warehouse receipts to his own order. The original grant of
power to him did not authorize the issuance of such instruments to himself, but he had done so nevertheless for a period
of years with the acquiescence of the corporation. The plaintiff, who had no knowledge of this prior activity, took one of
these instruments as collateral security and sought to enforce
it. The court admitted that the power had not originally
been granted but, relying on the course of business in which
he had exercised such power and which was never objected
to by the corporation, stated: "under such circumstances the
principal is estopped from asserting the truth, by his own-conduct in inducing third persons to believe that the agent had
due authority to act in the given case." 55 The court then disposed of the fact that the plaintiff had in no way relied on
any such past course of business by stating that

". .

.the

purchaser of a negotiable instrument, who purchases under
circumstances that throw upon him the duty of making inquiry as to its validity, assumes no greater risk by his failure to inquire than the burden of proving that the facts
which he could have discovered, had he inquired, would
have protected him. (IVilson v.Met. El. R'way Co., 120 N.Y.
145 ... )." 56
54 148 N.Y. 612, 43 N.E. 72 (1896).
55
Id. at 620-21, 43 N.E. at 74.
Id. at 622, 43 N.E. at 75. The Wilson case, cited and relied upon so
heavily by the court in establishing its argument, merely held that if a real
power existed permitting the official to issue or endorse instruments to himself.
although circumstances might alert a purchaser to believe otherwise, a failure
to investigate would not penalize the purchaser.
56
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Employing this reasoning, if the purchaser had inquired
he would have discovered that during a long course of dealing, acquiesced in by the corporation, the official had issued
such paper to himself within the scope of business. These
facts would have permitted the purchaser to invoke an
estoppel had he relied upon them. Reliance was thereby established when in fact it did not exist. This reasoning seems
motivated by an awareness that the result would have been
unsatisfactory if the traditional doctrine of apparent authority involving estoppel had been applied.
Proposed Solution
This policy question of agency signing power should be
resolved by employing the treatment of authority as set forth
in this paper. Thus, if the power to draw or endorse negotiable instruments is not originally granted, or if such power
is granted but the power to draw or endorse to the official
himself is not a part of the original grant, then any later
manifestation to third parties or to the agent will be sufficient to establish either of the powers as a real agency power.
If the manifestation to third parties is contrary to an express
denial to the official of either of such powers, which is a rare
occasion, or if there is no manifestation but merely a negligent failure to learn of such unauthorized activity, then no
power exists and only those who have rightfully relied on such
false manifestation or negligent inaction can claim the existence of an apparent power.
With the above solution, the third party is given the protection intended by the New York courts without distorting
fiduciary law in the process. The corporation is adequately
protected since it may operate on the assumption that unless
such powers are actually granted, they will not be implied
from mere official status. The case involving the one-man
corporation can continue to be treated as the exception because of the particular facts which make fiduciary law properly inapplicable.
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Early New York Decisions Re Signing Power
A distinction was drawn, in the preceding discussion, between the general power of the corporate official to draw or
endorse on behalf of the corporation and the power of such
official to draw or endorse to himself within the corporate
business. It is important to recognize that the second power
is not contained in the first by implication. New York law
has correctly made this distinction which is predicated upon
the general rule of agency that a principal is not bound by a
contract executed by an agent in favor of himself unless the
principal expressly consents to such activity. Notice concepts are not involved since there is a legal presumption that
such power does not exist in absence of affirmative action on
the part of the principal to the contrary.
Power to Draw or Endorse to Own Order
This principle was first applied in New York to negotiable instruments in Claflin v. Farmers' And Citizens'
Bank.5 7 There the president of the defendant bank, who had
a general power to certify checks on behalf of the bank, certified checks drawn by himself. The court stated:
It is a necessary and universal implication in all cases of agency,
that the power conferred upon the agent is to be exercised for the
exclusive benefit of the principal. It is repugnant to the very nature
and essence of such power to hold that it may be used for the benefit
of the agent in hostility to the interests of the principal. That a trustee or agent shall not act for his own benefit in any matter relating
to his agency or trust, is an old and familiar doctrine of the court of
equity, frequently asserted in the courts of this country .... 5s
It was therefore held that since the president had no power
to accept his own checks, the act was a palpable excess of
authority and any person taking the paper was bound to inquire as to the power of the agent so to contract.
5725 N.Y. 293 (1862).
58 Id. at 296-97.
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In ANational Banking Ass'n v. American Dock And Trust
Co., 9 which involved the issuance of negotiable paper by a
corporate official drawn to himself, the court further discussed the principle as applied to negotiable instruments:
It is an acknowledged principle of the law of agency that a general power or authority given to the agent to do an act in behalf of
the principal, does not extend to a case where it appears that the agent
himself is the person interested on the other side.
If such a power is intended to be given it must be expressed in
language so plain that no other interpretation can rationally be given
it, for it is against the general law of reason that an agent should be
intrusted with power to act for his principal and for himself at the
same time.60
The principle has been uniformly employed in subsequent
New York decisions to date and unquestionably conforms
with general business usage and practice. 6 1

It expresses the

fact that since the fiduciary's activity is representative, any
power which he exercises to benefit other than the represented
entity is not fiduciary power and should not be implied from
a grant which on its face is purely fiduciary.
Scope of Signing Power
Once there is a proper finding in the given case that a
real or apparent power exists in the corporate official to draw
or endorse in general or to himself, the next step is to determine whether such power has been exercised within its limits.
It must be recognized that the existence of agency power is
59 143 N.Y. 559, 38 N.E. 713 (1894).
60 Id. at 564, 38 N.E. at 714.
61 In Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926), which involved a sale of negotiable bonds by an agent in breach of authority, the court
stated: "Here, if Coster, Knapp & Co. had authority to sell the bonds it was
to sell them for the benefit of the plaintiff and in his interest. The authority
to sell was coupled with this limitation. They sold them for objects beyond
the power which had been given them .... Where a sale is authorized by an
agent for a specific purpose, as here for the benefit of the plaintiff, the object
for which the sale is to be made limits the authority to make it .... The sale
by such an agent for his own benefit is more than a mere disobedience of
instructions." Id. at 176, 155 N.E. at 90-91. See also.Wagner Trading Co.

v. National Bank, 228 N.Y. 37, 126 N.E. 347 (1920) ; Porges v. United States
Mortgage And Trust Co., 203 N.Y. 181, 96 N.E. 424 (1911).
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contained within its scope for its boundaries are a part of its
being. Granted that a real or apparent agency power may
exist, it is limited of course to acts performed for the benefit
of the principal. It is well to emphasize that acts apparently
authorized are only those acts actually performed for the
benefit of the principal although not actually authorized.
These acts may fall within the scope of an apparent but not
a real power.
Adverse Agency Activity
Adverse agency activity was involved in the case of North
River Bank v. Aymar.62 In this case a power of attorney was
given authorizing the agent to make or endorse notes in the
name of the principal. The agent made and endorsed a series
of notes, all outside the scope of the principal's business, for
the accommodation of a third party. The opinion stated that
the power to make or endorse was limited to notes in the
proper business of the principal regardless of whether such
limitation was expressed on the face of the power. While
admitting that the specific acts of making and endorsing were
outside the scope of any power real or apparent covering acts
within the business, the court nevertheless held the principal
liable on the notes. The decision was not based upon the
ordinary doctrine of apparent authority, admittedly inapplicable to the facts, but on the doctrine of estoppel by assisted
representation. The court stated:
Whenever the very act of the agent is authorized by the terms
of the power, that is, whenever by comparing the act done by the
agent with the words of the power, the act is in itself warranted by
the terms used, such act is binding on the constituent as to all persons
dealing in good faith with the agent. Such persons are not bound to
enquire into facts aliunde. The apparent authority is the real
authority. 63
The particular adaptability of the doctrine to the negotiable
instrument drawn or endorsed by the agent was noted in
New York & N.H. R.R. v. Schuyler: 64
62 3 Hill 262
63d. at 270.
6434

(N.Y. 1842).

N.Y. 30 (1865).
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The contrary doctrine would be singularly inconvenient, if not
absurd, in practice. For instance, under a general power to draw
bills, which means, of course, only in the business of the principal, no

party could safely take a bill drawn by the agent, without pursuing
the inquiry, whether it was drawn in such business, to extremes. If
the peril is on the party to whom the bill is given, nothing short of
personal application to the principal himself can relieve it, for nowhere
short of that, is absolute certainty. Every intermediate appearance or
representation may be false or deceptive, and the rigid rule of actual

authority will be satisfied, with nothing less than absolute verity. So,
then, the general power carries no safety whatever, since each bill
made under it must be verified as to extrinsic facts, by resort, for

perfect security, to the principal himself. 65
The employment of the doctrine generally in the law of agency
is subject to serious criticism. It has been rejected by many
jurisdictions, particularly because it shifts the protection of
the law appreciably in favor of parties who deal with agent
fiduciaries and is therefore a departure from the fundamental
purpose of fiduciary law, which is to protect the represented
entity.
The position that the doctrine should at least be made
applicable to negotiable instruments is a logical one because
of the unique nature of such paper. 6 In most situations involving corporate officials who transfer negotiable instruments drawn or endorsed outside the scope of the corporate
business, the transferees are aware of the agent's adverse
activity. Even if they are not, they are normally the only
persons dealing with the paper who are in a position to
readily investigate and determine whether the act is within
the scope of the power. Yet these parties usually discount
the paper rather than face the problem of enforcing it. Subsequent good faith purchasers of such paper should have some
degree of protection when agency signing power is exceeded
as distinguished from when it never existed, if the negotiable
instrument is to be of any value commercially. That such
protection is available through this doctrine is demonstrated
in Griswold v. Haven.67 There it was stated that:
65 Id. at 70.
r6 See 1 MECHE , AGENCY § 759 (2d ed. 1914).
6725 N.Y. 595 (1862).
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The law merchant gives effect to a negotiable instrument, according to its terms. As those terms import a dealing between the maker
and each person to whom the instrument may be transferred, it is so
treated. Hence any representation upon the face of paper of this description, is considered as made directly to every one who may become
its bona fide holder. (Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad., 114.). The
mere assumption by a partner or agent of power to execute such paper,
is a virtual representation to all who may take it of the existence of
every fact essential to the power.6
Thus far, the reasoning of the New York courts has been
basically sound in the corporate cases in this analysis. Early
decisions have properly distinguished apparent authority
from situations wherein agents have acted adversely to the
principal in signing corporate paper. Consonant with good
business policy, protection has been afforded the bona fide
purchaser of such paper through the doctrine of estoppel by
assisted representation. While notice rules were improperly
applied in other early cases, the holdings were in line with a
business policy that understandably affords maximum protection within the law to the holders of corporate paper. It
has been shown that the same results can be achieved by redefining apparent authority and thus avoiding such technical
error. It is submitted, however, that more than mere technical error exists in many later leading New York decisions
for they have improperly construed and applied these early
foundation principles.
Later New York Decisions
If a corporate official is granted a general power to draw
or endorse corporate paper and transfer it within the corporate business, cases such as Cluett v. Couture 69 have stated
that his act of drawing such paper to bearer or to the order
of the corporation or a third party, or his act of endorsing it
in blank or to a third party, is always actually authorized and
68

Id. at 602.

69 140 App. Div. 830, 125 N.Y. Supp. 813 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd mee., 206

N.Y. 668, 99 N.E. 1105 (1912). See also In re Troy & Cohoes Shirt Co., 136
Fed. 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1905); Salen v. Bank of New York, 110 App. Div. 636,
97 N.Y. Supp. 361 (1st Dep't 1906).
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only when he names himself payee or endorsee is the act unauthorized. If further facts show that he is also empowered
to draw or endorse to himself and transfer within the corporate business, all acts of drawing or endorsing on his part
are always actually authorized.
Diversion Versus Signing Power
Holdings based on these conclusions emphasize that the
only consideration is the subsequent transfer. If that transfer is made with the intention of diverting the proceeds of the
paper to the corporate official rather than to utilize them for
the benefit of the corporation, a diversion of the instrument
takes place. Diversion being a breach of trust, any holder
who takes with actual knowledge of such defect in title is not
a holder in due course. The sole issue then is whether the
purchaser had actual knowledge of the diversion at the time
of the negotiation to him.
Erroneous Distinction
It is submitted that the error in this reasoning lies in
the fact that the representative acts of drawing or endorsing
are never actually or apparently authorized unless they are
performed within the scope of the corporate business, providing that the scope of the power is not extended by a further power grant to such official authorizing him to use corporate assets for his own purposes.
The representative act of signing negotiable paper is
meaningless in itself. It becomes meaningful only when considered in context. It is one of two necessary acts in the
process of issuing negotiable instruments or negotiating order
paper. The real authorization to the corporate official in the
usual case is to issue or negotiate corporate paper within the
scope of business. The authorization of each necessary act
in an authorized process is dependent upon the performance
of the other necessary acts in such process. If the process
itself is unauthorized in the specific case then each act performed to accomplish the process is an unauthorized act.
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How then can it properly be determined whether the corporate official's act of drawing or endorsing negotiable corporate paper, in a specific case, is within the scope of a real
or apparent power governing such acts? If the subsequent
transfer is adverse to the corporate interests and no further
power was granted to him to use corporate assets for his own
purposes, that fact should be conclusive on the question of
whether the act of drawing or endorsing is adverse and therefore unauthorized, since the two acts are a necessary part of
one process.
True Distinction
Most New York decisions and some legal scholars have
refused to distinguish between diversion of the instrument
and its unauthorized signing.7° There is a well established
principle of negotiable instruments law that when an agent
is entrusted with negotiable paper for a particular purpose,
and fraudulently diverts it to another purpose, a person taking such paper or dealing in it in good faith will be protected.7 1 This protective principle is applicable in cases
where an examination of the instrument reveals that the entrusted party in possession is a holder.7 2 It presumes therefore that all the necessary signatures on such instrument
have been properly made.
7 Notably Professor Merrill, who states: "It is unquestionable that a
forged or unauthorized indorsement is ineffective to destroy the owner's rights,
whether under the Negotiable Instruments Act or under the decisions prior
thereto. But the agent does have authority to make indorsements in cases of
this type; he is unfaithful to his principal, but still he does an authorized act,
when he indorses a check in order to devote it to his own purposes." Merrill,
Bankers' Liability For Deposits Of A Fiduciary To His Personal Account,
40 HARv. L. REv. 1077, 1083 (1927).

71 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Manhattan Co., 150 N.Y. 250, 44 N.E. 775 (1896);
American Exchange Nat'l Bank v. New York Belting and Packing Co., 148
N.Y. 698, 43 N.E. 168 (1896); People v. Bank of North America, 75 N.Y.
547, 565 (1879); Bank of America v. Waydell, 103 App. Div. 25, 92 N.Y.
Supp. 666 (1st Dep't 1905), af'd, 187 N.Y. 115, 79 N.E. 857 (1907).
72 In the recent case of Munn v. Boasberg, 292 N.Y. 5, 53 N.E.2d 371
(1944), a check was entrusted to an agent by the drawer principal. The payee
was a third party, therefore the agent could not qualify as a holder of the
instrument. The check was transferred to the payee in payment of an obligation incurred by the agent. The payee could not qualify as a holder in due
course because he should have been aware from the face of the instrument that
the one in possession was not the owner and therefore presumptively could not
use it for his own purposes.
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Under such circumstances the agent holder gains the
power to transfer the instrument from the rule of negotiability.7 3 The same power exists in a thief or finder of
bearer paper. It is a real power, not a fiduciary power, but
the exercise of it by a fiduciary may in some instances be a
breach of trust. The power is derived from negotiable instruments law and the same law provides that it will not
arise if the instrument is restrictively endorsed.71 A failure
to utilize the restrictive endorsement will of course permit the
agent to divert the instrument by employing the power gained
as a holder under the N.I.L. It is elementary that an unempowered agent cannot create in himself the status of
holder, thereby deriving transfer power from sources outside
his principal.
Results of Erroneous Distinction
The "Serbonian Bog" into which this branch of the law
was plunged by the adoption of this initial error is plainly
evidenced in the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals.
In Cheever v. Pittsburgh,S. & L.E. R.R. 7 5 the president of
the defendant corporation, who was authorized to make notes
for corporate purposes, made a corporate note payable to a
third party who was his secretary and transferred it to him
without receiving consideration. The secretary endorsed it
back to the president, who then pledged it as collateral for a
personal loan made to him by the plaintiff's assignor.
The court reasoned that there could be no dispute as to
the actual authority of the president to make the note and
that the fraud upon the defendant consisted in the wrongful
use of it. Since the instrument was valid, a party to whom
it was negotiated would be protected unless he had actual
knowledge of the defect in title caused by the diversion. It
was decided that the assignor lender had no such knowledge
73 "For the purpose of rendering bills of exchange negotiable, the right of
property in them passes with the bills. Every holder with the bills takes the
property, and his title is stamped upon the bills themselves. The property and
the possession are inseparable."
Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. & P. 648, 651,
126 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1115 (C.P. 1797).
74 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMiENTS LAW

§ 47.

75 150 N.Y. 59, 44 N.E. 701 (1896).
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and the defendant was held liable on the note. The test employed in determining such knowledge was stated by the
court as:
He is not bound at his peril to be on the alert for circumstances
which might possibly excite the suspicion of wary vigilance; he does
not owe to the party who puts the paper afloat the duty of active inquiry in order to avert the imputation of bad faith. The rights of the
holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good
faith, and not by a speculative issue as to his diligence or negligence.
The holder's rights cannot be defeated without proof of actual notice
of the defect in title or bad faith on his part evidenced by circumstances. Though he may have been negligent in taking the paper, and
omitted precautions which a prudent man would have taken, nevertheless, unless he acted mala fide, his title, according to settled doctrine,
will prevail. 78
How apparent it becomes that if estoppel were employed,
the defendant might well have prevailed! The president was
not empowered to draw corporate paper unless it was for the
benefit of the corporation. He drew for his own benefit, which
fact is conclusively established by the transfer to the secretary for no value. Since the corporate signature was neither
actually nor apparently authorized, the corporation could
deny liability on the note unless it was estopped in the specific case. The limitations placed on the signing power were
such that the president was empowered to represent that he
could affix the corporate signature to all notes other than
those drawn to his own order. This representation he made
by the very act of signing the note.
If the plaintiff's assignor had the right to rely on such
representation, the corporation would be estopped from denying the validity of its signature. Since estoppel had to be
established against the company before the plaintiff's assignor
could qualify as a holder in respect to the company, he could
not be treated as a holder in establishing such estoppel. The
test was not the one required of a holder, that he have no
actual knowledge of a defect in title, but the objective test
of the reasonable man used in all instances involving estoppel.

76

Id. at 65, 44 N.E. at 703.
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A banker or businessman who is approached by a corporate official seeking a personal loan on the strength of collateral consisting of corporate paper drawn by him to a third
party and endorsed back to him personally, would possibly
suspect that the official was not empowered to draw such instrument regardless of the representations made by the official. At least the question should go to the jury and the
charge should be based on the objective test to give effect to
business practice as well as to correctly apply the legal principles involved.
The ink was hardly dry on the foregoing opinion when
the court must have realized that the commercial application
of the principle it established would seriously weaken corporate business and fifiance. Corporations, more so than any
other represented entity, are in an extremely vulnerable position regarding violations of fiduciary trust because of the
great volume of corporate funds and assets which pass daily
through the hands of corporate officials.7
Realizing this
danger, commerce relies heavily on the fact that title to the
assets is not vested in the agent but in the represented entity.
It is therefore common business practice to question the signing authority of a corporate official on a negotiable instrument if circumstances in a particular case would alert an
ordinary businessman to possible adverse agency activity.
The Cheever decision struck at the foundations of New
York business. It no longer permitted business practice to
be a material consideration in determining the binding effect
of a corporate signature on the one controlling device of all
corporate assets-the negotiable instrument. If actual knowledge was to be the substitute for this practice, corporate finance was literally at the mercy of the ignorant and the
unscrupulous. Such was an untenable position for the
Empire State, but unless the error in the Cheever case was
corrected, the problem seemed insurmountable. Hidden away
in the decision were several lines of dictum which seemed to
run contrary to the holding itself. The court had stated:
7 See the excellent discussion of the problem by Chester and Edith Rohrlich,
Psychological Foundations For The Fiduciary Concept In Corporation Law,
38 CoLum. L. Rxv. 432 (1938).
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The holder of a note who has no actual knowledge or notice of
a defect in the title, or other equities between the parties, when circumstances come to his knowledge sufficient to put him upon inquiry,
is chargeable with knowledge of all the facts that such inquiry would
have revealed. 78
Four years later, the court, evidently inspired by this
dictum, presented a solution which provided even greater protection to the corporate entity than had formerly existed.
The pendulum had indeed swung to the other extreme!
The facts in the case of Rochester &. C.T.R. Co. v.
Paviour71 were tailored to act as a vehicle for this solution.
The treasurer of the plaintiff corporation, who was authorized
to sign or endorse corporate paper within the corporate business, gave two checks drawn on a corporate account in payment of premiums on four fire insurance policies. The corporation had no interest in the policies nor was the treasurer
authorized to use corporate assets for personal purposes. The
recipient of the checks was aware that corporate funds were
being used by the official to pay his private debt.
Even if the authority of the treasurer to draw the checks
in question is admitted, it is elementary that a fiduciary diverts if he uses the assets of the represented entity for his own
purposes. When such diversion occurs, the issue in relation
to third parties is strictly one of notice. Actual knowledge
of such diversion is established if a party knows that the
fiduciary is using such assets and he knows further that it is
a personal use. Of course, if the personal use is actually empowered, then this further fact exonerates the fiduciary and
makes the other facts immaterial.8 0 Subjective good faith is
78 Cheever v. Pittsburgh, S. & L.E. R.R., 150 N.Y. 59, 67, 44 N.E. 701,
703 (1896).

,9 164 N.Y. 281, 58 N.E. 114 (1900).
80 The only caveat in this respect is the trust fund doctrine as applied to
corporations which sets an implied limit to the signing power of the corporate
official. The assets of a corporation are looked upon as a fund for the benefit
of creditors and it is a breach of duty to transfer such assets to stockholders
or corporate officials if creditors' rights intervene. Since this equity exists in
the creditor of an insolvent corporation, anyone who takes corporate paper
drawn or endorsed by an official to himself under circumstances which would
alert a reasonable man to an awareness of this existing equity, cannot prove
that the corporate signature was authorized since there was no real or apparent
power to make it. Reif v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 268 N.Y. 269.
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no protection if there is actual knowledge of facts which in
law establish a defense, as there was in the Paviour case.
Commercial Bad Faith Notice Concept
This obvious approach was not taken by the court for
opportunity was at hand to remedy the adverse effect of the
Cheerer decision. Here were facts which made diversion apparent to any reasonable man, yet the party dealing with the
corporate official had satisfactorily established his subjective
good faith in the lower court. The Court of Appeals stated:
If the defendant knew or believed, or had good reason to believe,
that, in giving the checks, Briggs [the treasurer] was appropriating
the money of the plaintiff to the payment of his own debt, or one
that he treated as his own, he had no right to accept them without
inquiry. While he was not bound to be on the watch for facts which
would put a very cautious man on his guard, he was bound to act in
good faith. (Second National Bank. v. Weston, 161 N.Y. 520, 526;
Cheererv. Pittsburgh,etc., R.R. Co., 150 N.Y. 59, 66.) Even if his
actual good faith is not questioned, if the facts known to him should
have led him to inquire, and by inquiry he would have discovered the
real situation, in a commercial sense he acted in bad faith and the law
will withhold from him the protection that it would otherwise extend. 8
Not content with this death blow to the actual knowledge notice standard recognized but misapplied in the
Cheever case, the court continued:
The facts known to the defendant should have aroused his suspicion and led him, as an honest man, to make some investigation
before he accepted the money of a corporation, which owed him nothing, in payment of a claim that he held against some one else. If he
had such confidence in Briggs that he was willing to trust him without
inquiry, under suspicious circumstances of a substantial character, he
must stand the loss, for he failed to discharge a duty required by
commercial integrity ....

Among the heaviest losses in business are

those which result from a blind trust in men on account of their
standing in the community, without making the investigation required
197 N.E. 278 (1935); Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N.Y. 61, 84 N.E. 585

(1908).
si Rochester & C.T.R. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N.Y. 281, 284, 58 N.E. 114, 115

(1900).
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by common prudence .... One who suspects, or ought to suspect, is
bound to inquire, and the law presumes that he knows what a proper
inquiry would disclose. While the courts are careful to guard the interests of commerce by protecting the negotiation of commercial paper,
they are also careful to guard against fraud by defeating titles taken
in bad faith, or with knowledge, actual or imputed, which amounts
to bad faith, when regarded from a commercial standpoint.8 2
There, in black and white to act as a guide post for all
who followed, was the objective test of business practice used
to determine the status of a holder of a negotiable instrument.
Instead of ruling that estoppel could not be invoked because
a reasonable man under the same circumstances would not
have been justified in relying upon the power representations
of the corporate official, the court elected to substitute constructive knowledge for the actual knowledge requirement of
the N.I.L. Faulty analysis had caused fiduciary law and
negotiable instruments law to finally collide and from that
clash had come the commercial bad faith notice concept.
Of equal importance with this notice error was the fact
that the court adopted the reasoning which labeled such
transfer a diversion of the instrument. If the agent is considered as having the representative power to transfer in such
case, he passes legal title to the third party. If such act is
labeled "diversion of the instrument," then an equitable right
of ownership is all that remains in the principal. Third
party equities of ownership are not proper defenses to parties
primarily liable on negotiable instruments in the majority of
jurisdictions, including New York. 83 Under the reasoning of
the court, if a note owned by a corporation as payee or endorsee is transferred by a corporate official in abuse of his
endorsing power, then since only a diversion of the instrument takes place, a transferee with knowledge of the diversion may enforce it against a maker who has no defense of
his own, unless the corporation is made a party to the action.
On the other hand, if correct reasoning is employed in such
case, the maker is required to set up as a defense the legal
82
83

Id. at 285-86, 58 N.E. at 115.
BRITrO N, BILLS AND NoTs §§ 159, 160 (1943) ; Comment, 26 ST. JOHN's

L. REv. 135 (1951).
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title in the corporation, since legal title in a third person is a
valid defense in all jurisdictions. Additional protecton is
thereby given the principal or corporation by availing such
entities relief through the maker's defense as well as by independent affirmative action.
For over thirty years both errors continued unchecked,
during which time the commercial bad faith notice concept
was slowly perfected and divorced from its original narrow
confines of fiduciary law. Finally, the Court of Appeals in
4
Wen Kroy Realty Co. v. Public Nat'l Bank d Trust Co.
attempted to wipe out the fallacies which had persisted since
the turn of the century. In that case, the plaintiff corporation had authorized its president to manage its business. The
president endorsed the corporate name coupled with his name
as president to a check made payable to the corporation. He
then procured another to sign the blank endorsement as secretary, though in fact he was not the secretary and had no
authority to act as such. The president then deposited the
check in the defendant bank to the account of another corporation of which he was also president. The defendant collected the check and permitted the withdrawal of the proceeds
by the president, who converted them. The plaintiff corporation sued the defendant bank for conversion of the check.
The majority opinion, after first assuming that power
existed in the president to endorse and transfer corporate
paper, limited such power to transfers made on behalf of the
corporation in the course of its business. At this point the
court departed from the long line of precedent and stated:
Whether an indorsement of a check payable to a corporation is
an act performed in the course of the corporate business or the conversion of the property of the corporation, is an extrinsic fact particularly within the knowledge of the person authorized to transact that
business. In such circumstances an innocent third party may ordinarily rely upon the representations of the agent. (Farmers &
Mechanics Bank v. Butchers & DroversBank, 16 N.Y. 125.) Even
if we were to assume that the president of the corporation had actual
or apparent authority to indorse checks in the course of the corporate
business that rule would have no application here, for the president
8 260 N.Y. 84, 183 N.E. 73 (1932).
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of the corporation authorized to transact its business did not represent
that he, acting alone, had authority to indorse this check, nor did he
assume to act as sole agent .... The check in question having, therefore, been indorsed or transferred without authority, even colorable,
the question of the defendant's good faith or want of notice does not
enter into the case, any more than it would if the check had been indorsed only by the secretary. Lacking authority at inception, the defendant acquired no title to the money and must pay it back to the
plaintiff, the rightful owner. (Standard Steam Specialty Co. v. Corn
Exchange Bank, 220 N.Y. 478.)85
How terse yet accurate was this brilliant summary of
law which had been misstated for so long a period! Once
again the doctrine of estoppel by assisted representation was
established as the guide in determining the validity of the
signing power of the corporate official. The commercial bad
faith notice concept was discarded since it had no bearing on
a problem which was essentially one of deteriniig extent
of authority. In addition the error regarding diversion of the
instrument was finally corrected.
The dissenting opinion very cogently presented the opposing position, supported by arguments which of necessity
were based upon concepts of power and aifthority in conflict
with those established in this paper.
Incredible though it may seem, the l¥en Kroy case was
either completely overlooked or studiously avoided by subsequent New York decisions which continued to cite the
Cluett and Cheever cases as binding precedent.8 6 Whatever
the motivation may have been for its lack of recognition, the
fact remains that today the New York courts labor under a
cloud of error and uncertainty in this field which could easily
he dispelled by a re-examination and acceptance of the principles laid down in the TVen Kroy and Yorth River Bank
87
eases.
85 Id. at 92-93, 183 N.E. at 75-76.
86

In Thomson v. New York Trust Co., 293 N.Y. 58, 56 N.E.2d 32 (1944).

the majority opinion followed the Chiett case while the dissenting opinion
argued on the basis of the Wen Kroy holding.
87 It is becoming more and more evident in recent decisions that this cloud
is beginning to extend beyond the fiduciary cases, at least in respect to dictum.
See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 296 N.Y. 226, 72 N.E.2d
166 (1947), wherein the court states: "Nor are the rights of a purchaser
[of a negotiable instrument] to be affected by constructive notice, unless it
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The last and most important consideration is the negotiable instrument held by a fiduciary. Again, the application of the fiduciary power concept is the key to an understanding of the dual role played by fiduciary and negotiable
instruments law in this situation.
Estoppet
Granting its inapplicability to representative contract
power, if a fiduciary other than an agent is actually empowered but acts adversely, can the doctrine of estoppel be
invoked to create al apparent power for such activity? The
adverse act of any fiduciary is not a representative. act and
should not rightfully be categorized as a fiduciary act. Unless
estoppel is applicable, a trustee with a power of sale over
trust assets should not be capable of binding the entity if
he sells such assets intending to misappropriate the proceeds,
for the act of selling in such case is not representative. The
principles of law applicable to the agent fiduciary in this
respect should be equally applicable to all other fiduciaries.
New York law has answered the question in the affirmative and the reasoning employed has been in line with the
majority of jurisdictions and with that of the foremost modern authorities on fiduciary law.s8 The case of Kirsch v.
Tozier 8 laid down the following general principle:
Persons dealing with a trustee must take notice of the scope of his
authority. An act within his authority will bind the trust estate or
the beneficiaries as to third persons acting in good faith and without
notice, although the trustee intended to defraud the estate, and actually did accomplish his purpose by means of the act in question. It
has frequently been held that a person dealing with an executor, administrator or trustee, who, from the nature of his office, or by the
clearly appear that the inquiry suggested by the facts disclosed at the time of
the purchase would if fairly pursued result in the discovery of the defect existing but hidden at the time. . .

Sec 4 BOGERT,
§ 297.5 (1939).
88

."

Id. at 230, 72 N.E.2d at 169.

TRUSTS AXD TRUSTEES

89 143 N.Y. 390. 38 N.E. 375 (1894).

§ 901 (1935); 2 Scor,
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terms of the trust, has power to satisfy or transfer the securities of
the estate, or to vary the investment from time to time, is not bound
to go further and ascertain whether in fact the act of the executor or
trustee is justified, and that no breach of trust was intended. It is,
sufficient for his protection that he acts in good faith, and if the act
of the executor or trustee is justified by the terms of the power, the
party dealing with him is protected. (Fuld v. Schieffelin, 7 Jo. Ch.
153.) .9
It should be noted that the court labeled the adverse act
as "within his authority." Such terminology allows the erroneous conclusion that adverse activity is included in the
doctrine of apparent authority. Actually, a right of reliance
is established, just as in the agency cases, when the trustee is
actually empowered. Such power impliedly authorizes the
fiduciary to represent that he is acting in a representative
manner in its execution. The recognition of the reliance requirement is the recognition of estoppel with its objective
notice standard.
Bona Fide Purchaser
Estoppel greatly simplifies the problem of determining
the bona fides of a purchaser of property from a known fiduciary. One of the protections afforded the represented entity
by fiduciary law is the principle that such purchasers must
make inquiry at their peril as to the right of the fiduciary
to make the transfer. In respect to such right, the legal presumption is that it does not exist in a trustee with respect to
trust properties; hence one who alleges that a trustee is authorized to sell must first prove the existence of dispositive
power. 0 1 On the other hand, executors, administrators and
guardians, in absence of statute, generally have full power to
sell the personal estate under their charge and purchasers
from them need not establish it when proving authority. 92
The simplification of the duty of inquiry lies in the fact that
once it is shown that selling power exists in the fiduciary,
gold.

at 395-96, 38 N.E. at 376-77.
91 Duncan v. Jaudon, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 165 (1872) ; Geyser-Marion Gold
Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558 (8th Cir. 1901).
92 See 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 225 (7th ed. 1929).
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the doctrine of estoppel ordinarily protects such purchaser in
the event that the fiduciary acts adversely in making the sale.
Holder Selling Power
When these principles of fiduciary law are applied to a
negotiable instrument offered for sale by a fiduciary, it becomes apparent that the duty of inquiry required of its purchaser by fiduciary law is satisfied by an examination of the
instrument. Since the sole question is whether the fiduciary
has a power of sale,0 3 any purchaser should be aware of the
fact that negotiable instruments law gives selling power to a
holder, even a fiduciary holder, for this is the core of the rule
of negotiability.0 4 If the instrument reveals that the fiduciary is its payee or endorsee, or that it is bearer paper, then
the prospective purchaser has actual knowledge of the fiduciary's actual power to sell such instrument either by adverse
or representative act.
It was held by some early cases that if an instrument
established the holder as a fiduciary payee or endorsee, that
fact was notice to all that he held restrictively and as such
could not further negotiate the instrument. 5 These holdings
were rejected by an overwhelming majority of cases and the
holder fiduciary was firmly established in negotiable instru93 "The fact that the word 'trustee' is on the face of the note does not put
the purchaser to any inquiry beyond ascertaining whether the trustee has the
power to sell or otherwise dispose of it." Owens v. Nagel, 334 Ill. 96, 165
N.E. 165, 167 (1929).
94 "Ordinarily, one in possession of a negotiable instrument has the power
to dispose of it. Certainly, where the one in possession is the payee on the
face of the instrument, even in a trust capacity, he has the right in such
capacity to negotiate it." Quanah, A. & P. Ry. v. State Bank & Trust Co.,
127 Tex. 407, 93 S.W.2d 701, 704 (1936).
A distinction has been drawn between "holder selling power" and "the
apparent power of one who sells to a bona fide purchaser." "The divested
owner is a party to the transfer as a kind of undisclosed principal of a power
conferred on the seller by his own act or acquiescence, in clothing him with
the external indicia of title or authority. In some exceptional cases such as
money, market overt where a thief or finder can give title, and negotiable instruments, the power is one conferred by law to facilitate ready transfer on
the strength of possession." Ballantine, Purchase For Value And Estoppel,
6 Mn . L. REv. 87, 122 (1922).
95 Third Nat'l Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 138 (1878); Hazeltine v. Keenan,
54 W. Va. 600, 46 S.E. 609 (1904).
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ments law as one who had real power to sell in his own right.9 6
-Notice of fiduciary holding did not terminate negotiability
and, at least with reference to purchase, the fiduciary title
9 7
was treated as surplusage.
It was also held that although negotiability was not terminated by an endorsement to a fiduciary, the holder in such
case was a restrictive endorsee and took only the rights of
his restrictive endorser.9 8 This view has received severe criticism. The more logical view is that the fiduciary endorsee
holder may be a holder in due course although his endorser
was not. 9 It may be argued, therefore, that the fiduciary
payee or endorsee of a negotiable instrument has the full
status of a holder under the N.L.L., with no restrictions on
his actual selling power.
The legal world was made fully aware of the completeness of holder selling power by the famous article of Professor Chafee, Rights In Overdue Paper, published in 1918.10'
The article establishes that even a thief can pass legal title
to a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or endorsed in
blank because such thief is a holder under the N.I.L. It rejects Professor Ewart's claim that wrongdoing holders pass
96 See, e.g., Davis v. Garr, 6 N.Y. 124 (1851); Central State Bank v.
Spurlin, 111 Iowa 187, 82 N.W. 493 (1900) ; American Surety Co. v. Multnomah
County, 171 Ore. 287, 138 P.2d 597 (1943) ; Ford v. H. C. Brown & Co., 114
Tenn. 467, 88 S.W. 1036 (1905) ; Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank v. Looney, 99 Tenn.
278, 42 S.W. 149 (1897); Fox v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 37 S.W. 1102
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1896) ; Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Crawford, 69 W. Va. 109,
70 S.E. 1089 (1911).
97 The fact that notice of fiduciary holding does not terminate negotiability
has led some to believe that it in no way affects due course holding. Professor
Britton states: "The general rule is that the purchaser, though not a holder in
due course as regards the equity of ownership of the defrauded cestui que
trust or the principal, may be a holder in due course as regards equities of
defense of obligors on the instrument." BRIrrON, BILLS AND NoTEs 488 (1943).
See also 2 Scor'r, TRUSTS § 297.6 (1939).
It is true that notice of fiduciary holding in itself is not knowledge of a
defect in title. However, knowledge that the fiduciary is using the instrument
for his own purposes should prevent the transferee from being a holder in due
course and permit the maker to raise any personal defense which he may have,
since he takes with actual knowledge of title defect. Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa.
549, 137 Atd. 113 (1927).
98 Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93 (1919).
99 See Smith, The Concept Of "Negotiability" As Used In Section 47 Of
The Negotiable Instruments Law, 7 TEXAs L. Rxv. 520 (1929).
See also
Chafee, Remarks On Restrictive Indorsetnents, 58 HARV. L. REv. 1182 (1945).
10031 HARV. L. Rxv. 1104 (1918).
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only an apparent title created by estoppel.1 0 1 Professor
Chafee's position is that "the legal title to a negotiable instrument throughout its existence belongs to the person to
whom the promises run by the terms of the instrument if he
has possession, no matter how that possession came to
him." 102 His estoppel rejection would have been strengthened
had he noted the fact that the N.I.L. requires actual knowledge of a wrongdoing holder's title defect as notice of such
fact, rather than the estoppel requirement of knowledge which
would alert a reasonable man.
Trust Law Conflict
Strangely enough, holder selling power is a fact which
trust authorities seem to have completely disregarded. This
is unfortunate because trust law has been the primary guide
in decisions involving controversies wherein the purchaser
from a fiduciary holder is an opposite party to the represented
entity. It has been explained that the reasoning of the cases
which establish the fiduciary holder's power of sale is limited
to cases in which the represented entity is not a party, and it
is only in such cases that the actual knowledge notice requirement of the N.I.L. is applicable. 10 3 However, notice of fiduciary breach of trust should be a material consideration in
any suit involving an instrument negotiated by a holder fiduciary, whether the represented entity is or is not involved.
It is inconsistent to say that the type of notice depends upon
who is the plaintiff and that a party's good faith in a transaction already terminated depends upon whether he is suing
or being sued at a later date.
In spite of this inconsistency, the prevailing view today
is that a prospective purchaser of negotiable paper from a
trustee holder has a duty, in respect to the represented entity,
to determine whether a power of sale exists in such transferor
because he has knowledge of facts which would alert a rea101 See Ewart, Negotiability And Estoppel, 16 L.Q. Rlv. 135 (1900).
102 Chafee, supra note 100, at 1112.
103 See Meyer Milling Co. v. Strohfeld, 222 Mo. 1194, 4 S.W.2d 864, 865

(1928).
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sonable man to make investigation."0 4 A standard text on
trust law which has been widely quoted in cases dealing with
this point states:
Of course knowledge on the part of the purchaser, that the executor or administrator is dealing with the assets in a fiduciary capacity,
is not enough to raise any suspicion, for the reason that it is the duty
of the administrator to dispose of the assets and settle the estate; and
so a trustee may sell and transfer absolutely the personal property
of his trust, if he have power to vary the securities; and if he sells
and transfers notes, stocks, or other securities standing in his name
as trustee, the purchaser, from that fact alone, cannot be holden as a
constructive trustee, although the trustee in fact transfers such securities in order to obtain money for his own personal use. The mere
fact that the word "trustee" is on the face of the securities cannot put
a purchaser to any inquiry beyond ascertaining whether the trustee
has power to vary the securities. If he has such power, a purchaser
in good faith will be protected, although the trustee use the money
for his private purposes. 10 5
In refutation of the above reasoning, it is submitted that
the sale itself by the holder fiduciary should not be treated in
trust law as a representative one. The purchaser is entitled
to disregard the fiduciary title because of the fiduciary's real
selling power as a holder. Rules governing the bona fide purchase of trust property are not applicable to this purchase
because in law the sale itself is treated as personal and not
representative. It is true of course that the purchaser is
aware of the fact that he is dealing with a fiduciary but this
knowledge only charges him in fiduciary law with a duty to
avoid conscious participation in a breach of trust.
The reason why it is of prime importance to recognize
that the power of sale in the fiduciary holder is more than a
fiduciary power lies in the fact that if his power depended
solely on the representative power conferred upon him by
fiduciary law, estoppel would be the only remedy in the event
that his act of selling was adverse. Consequently, if a reasonable man should have been aware from the circumstances
204 See Scott, PartiipationIn A Breach Of Trust, 34 HARv. L. REV. 454, 458,
463 (1921).
'5 1 PERRY, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 225, at 395-96 (7th ed. 1929).
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that the holder fiduciary was acting adversely in selling the
instrument, a transferee who took in subjective good faith
would have no right to rely on the representations of the fiduciary that the representative power was correctly exercised.
But when the fiduciary is a holder, and as such is capable of
passing actual title to his transferee, application of the objective notice rule of estoppel conflicts with the actual knowledge requirement of the N.I.L. Estoppel is properly applicable in cases involving agents who lack real signing power.
However, if the agent is a holder himself, then he is treated
in law as a trustee 106 and estoppel is no longer applicable
because of his real power to sell arising from the N.L..
Trust Law BReconciliation
Since a conflicting dual notice requirement is ineonsitent with right reason, it is submitted that the notice requirement of the N.I.L. should be the sole notice standard in all
cases involving negotiable instruments once proper power is
established, regardless of the parties involved. This will insure adequate protection of the concept of negotiability. This
may prove unacceptable to trust law authorities who may well
argue that right reason can be satisfied by employing the fiduciary law notice requirement as the sole notice standard. If
so, then it is further submitted that fiduciary law itself, if
properly applied to holder fiduciary cases, would establish the
same notice requirement as the N.I.L.
Fiduciary law does not limit participation in a breach
of trust to the improper transfer of trust property. Third
party liability for such participation depends upon breach of
duty. The duty placed upon purchasers is to determine, at
their peril, whether the fiduciary has the power to sell. The
objective notice standard is applied to purchasers and if only
an apparent power of sale exists, the purchaser is protected
if a right of reliance can be established. However, once an
actual power to sell is present, notice becomes immaterial.
The purchaser of an instrument from a holder fiduciary complies with all purchase requirements of fiduciary law because
100 Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N.Y. 389 (1860).
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the fiduciary has an actual power of sale over the specific
instrument at the time it is sold. Nevertheless, observance
of one duty will not exonerate a party from liability for participation in a breach of trust if there is failure to comply
with another duty.
Participation in a breach of trust may occur otherwise
than by improperly receiving transfer of trust property. As
stated in the Restatement of Trusts:
If a third person pays or conveys to the trustee money or other
property which the trustee as such is authorized to receive, and the
trustee misapplies the money or other property, the third person is
liable for participation in the breach of trust, if, but only if, when he
made such payment or conveyance he had notice that the trustee was
107
misapplying or intending to misapply the money or other property.
It has already been established that the party who buys
from a holder fiduciary knows that the fiduciary is authorized to receive the proceeds of that specific sale since his selling power is unlimited. It is submitted that in such case the
only circumstance which can establish notice of misapplication of proceeds, in absence of direct statements of intention
made by the fiduciary, is the fact that the fiduciary used the
instrument to pay his own debt or to pay for goods or services
rendered for his sole benefit. Knowledge of this fact is knowledge in itself of a defense because of the presumption that
the fiduciary acts adversely when he acts for himself. Actual
knowledge is therefore the notice requirement in such cases.' 0
Originally the courts required of third parties dealing
with trustees the utmost investigation of the trustee's acts.
However, this requirement that third parties supervise the
conduct of fiduciaries proved intolerable and seriously re§ 321 (1935).
charge a stranger to a trust fund as a trustee, by reason of participation in a misapplication of the fund, upon the ground that the fund was used
in payment of a private debt of the original trustee, it is necessary to show
107 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
108

"To

not only that the party sought to be charged was aware that the fund was a
trust fund, but also that he was aware that the debt to the payment of which
it was applied, was, at the time of such application, in fact a private debt,-a
debt of such character that the fund in question could not lawfully be applied
in payment thereof." Fifth Nat'l Bank v. Village of Hyde Park, 101 Ill.
595,
604 (1882). See also Perry v. Oerman & Blaebaum, 63 W. Va. 566, 60 S.E.

604 (1908).
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tarded the administration of trusts. Consequently, there developed in fiduciary law a trend which today favors an actual
knowledge notice requirement for third party liability in
breach of trust participation when the problem of purchase
is not involved. 10 9 Mere negligence in failing to detect adverse fiduciary activity should not make for such liability as
long as there is honesty in fact. 1 0
Uniform FiduciariesAct
In line with this trend, the Uniform FiduciariesAct is
an ambitious but unsuccessful attempt to bring the law of
trusts into conformity with the N.I.L."'1 The act has been
rejected by the majority of states ostensibly because it is too
extreme and gives excessive protection to third parties dealing with fiduciaries. Actually, the act is deficient because it
fails to distinguish between real and apparent power and
draws no clear distinction between the existence of power and
its abuse. 1 2 These distinctions are of vital importance on the
subject of notice and any legislative act relating to fiduciaries
is incomplete unless it contains them.
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the act, dealing with holders of
negotiable paper drawn or endorsed by fiduciaries, are the
defective sections. As stated by Henry Upson Sims in a recent article on fiduciary law:
•. . Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Fiduciaries Act are absolutely destruc-

tive of the moral responsibility of businessmen to cooperate in protecting each other against acts of misconduct and fraud on the part
of those whom they trust. The author of this article was a member
of the committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which
sat in 1921 to draft the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, and he can only
109 See Note, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 863 (1933).
110 "To establish joint liability of the bank for the derelictions of the trustee,
the plaintiffs must prove that the bank gave to the wrongdoer such assistance
as would make the bank a participant in the wrong. Proof that the bank failed
in care is insufficient." Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 94,
102, 38 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1941). See Scott, ParticipationIn A Breach Of Trust,

34 HARv. L. REv. 454, 481-82 (1921).
III See Comment, 24 COLUm. L. REv. 661 (1924).
112 See Bulletin No. 5, Memo. No. 117 of the Committee on the Amendment
of the Law, 29 Ass'x OF

(1924).
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plead guilty to crass ignorance in not recognizing at the time the
enormous blunder of approving all its provisions. Fortunately that
Act has been adopted by only twenty-two states. 113
SUMMARY OF NOTICE STANDARDS RECONCILIATION

From the foregoing analysis the following propositions
are deducible:
1. Any transferee of a negotiable instrument drawn by
a fiduciary other than an agent cannot enforce the instrument against the assets of the represented.entity unless it was
issued pursuant to a power to borrow money for the benefit
of such entity or in payment of a legitimate and proper expense necessarily incurred by the fiduciary on its behalf. This
is true whether the instrument be bearer or order paper, or
whether the named payee is a third party or the fiduciary
himself. The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable since there
is no basis for any apparent representative contract power.
2. In the absence of apparent authority, any transferee
of a negotiable instrument drawn or endorsed by an agent
fiduciary in the name of his principal cannot hold the principal liable as maker or claim title against him as endorsee
unless the agent has an actual agency power either to perform the specific act of signing or to represent that he has
such power. Apparent authority will exist in a given case
only if the signing act, although actually unempowered, is
performed for the benefit of the principal. In such case, a
manifestation to third parties or a ratification that the signing act is empowered must be made by the principal to the
knowledge of the transferee or to the knowledge of someone
through whom the transferee claims title.
3. If an actual agency power does not exist to perform
the signing act in the specific case, the only possible remedy
of the transferee is estoppel. Before estoppel can be invoked,
it must be objectively established that under the circumstances a reasonable man would have responded in the same
manner as the transferee or the one through whom the transferee claims title. If this cannot be done, the right to rely
113 Sims, The Modern Tendency To Relax Protection Of Beneficiaries
ALA. L. REv. 15, 28 (1950).
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is non-existent and the claim fails. This objective test is in
no way inconsistent with the actual knowledge requirement
needed to establish notice under the N.I.L. because the status
of holder must first exist before such protection can be
claimed. Unless the validity of the corporate or principal's
signature is proven, the claimant has not established himself
as a holder in respect to such represented entity.
4. When a fiduciary endorses and sells prior to maturity any instrument of which he is the holder and which
he himself has not drawn, a strong argument can be made for
the conclusion that the purchaser is protected against the
property claims and personal defenses of all other parties in
such instrument of which such purchaser has no actual
knowledge. This is completely consistent with the notice requirements of fiduciary law because the sale was actually
empowered and constructive knowledge is not properly applicable in fiduciary law in respect to third party participation in breach of trust when purchase is not directly involved.
5. The doctrine of estoppel only applies to situations involving agent fiduciaries dealing with negotiable
instruments.
CONCLUSION

It may therefore be concluded that this reconciliation
has achieved its purpose. If the foregoing propositions are
followed by the judiciary, the holder in due course of the
N.I.L. will be given the protection he was intended to receive
by the application of holder selling power. The represented
entity of fiduciary law will receive its proper protection because it will only be bound by acts of the fiduciary which
are actually or apparently empowered. If actual signing
power exists in the fiduciary, then actual knowledge is required to defeat the transfer if the power is abused. If only
an apparent signing power exists, and this is applicable only
to the agent fiduciary, then constructive knowledge may defeat the transfer because estoppel is the basis of apparent
power. The apportionment of protection thus afforded is
completely in line with acceptable socioeconomic viewpoints,
and has been accomplished without the sacrifice or compromise of any of the principles of reasoning applicable to notice
in either of the two bodies of law.

